1. Why does Descartes hold that he is essentially a thinking thing? Because:
a. He can conceive of himself as existing without being extended.
b. He cannot conceive of himself as existing without thinking.
c. He can conceive of his body as existing without it thinking.
d. He cannot conceive of his body as existing without it being extended.
2. The necessity of identities is the principle according to which:
a. If x and y share all their properties then necessarily x is identical with y.
b. If x is identical with y, then necessarily x and y share all their properties
c. If x is identical with y, then necessarily x is identical with y.
d. If x is identical with y and s knows that x is F then necessarily s knows that y is F.
3. What does Gilbert Ryle mean when he says that Cartesians commit a 'category mistake'?
a. That they make a conceptual mistake: they fail to distinguish between two categories of mental states: qualitative and non-qualitative mental states; while it is true that the former are not fully capturable in behavioural terms, the latter can be given straightforward behavioural analyses.
b. That they make a conceptual mistake: they mistakenly take mental state terms to designate entities which bear no relation whatsoever to behavioural dispositions.
c. That they make a conceptual mistake: they mistakenly take mental state terms to designate entities which are distinct from and exist alongside physical entities.
d. That they make an empirical mistake: they have drawn hasty conclusions regarding the na ture of mental states from the superficial investigation of the physical world.
4. Jack Smart and other identity theoriests hold that mental states are identical with brain states. Which notion of identity is in play here?
a. Identity as exact similarity (or qualitative identity).
b. Vague identity.
c. Strict identity (or numerical identity)
d. Relative identity.
5. Smart's case for the identity theory essentially rests on the claim that:
a. The fact that mind-body correlations hold effectively rules out any alternative position on the mind-body problem.
b. Mind-brain identities provide the simplest, most ontologically parsimonious explanation of mind-brain correlations.
c. Failure to identify mental states with brain states would result in the fundamental physical constituents of the world 'dangling' from the nomological net of physical science.
d. There is no logically possible world in which mental states are not identical to brain states.
6. According to functionalism, for a system s to instantiate a mental property M is for s to:
a. Be in an internal state which stands in appropriate causal/functional relations to sensory inputs and other internal states, irrespective of its relations to behavioural outputs.
b. Be in an internal state which stands in appropriate causal/functional relations to other internal states and behavioral outputs, irrespective of its relations to sensory inputs.
c. Be in an internal state which standards in appropriate causal/functional relations to sensory inputs, and behavioural outputs, irrespective of its relations to other internal states.
d. Be in an internal state which stands in appropriate causal/functional relations to sensory inputs, other internal states, and behavioural outputs.
7. David Armstrong's argument for the identity theory proceeds in two steps. The first step consists of
a. An a priori analysis according to which the concept of any given mental state is the concept of a state instantiated by a physical substance.
b. An a priori analysis according to which the concept of any given mental state is the concept of a state apt for being caused by certain input sand apt to cause certain outputs.
c. An a posteriori claim: the claim that, as a matter of fact, types of mental properties systematically correlate with types of brain states.
d. An a posteriori claim: the claim that as a matter of fact, any token mental state is identical to some token brain state.