Assignment:
JUSTICE STREIT
FACTS
Nicholas Lloyd was a Drake University security guard on duty at the annual Drake Relays street-painting event on April 20, 2002. A student told Lloyd about an apparent altercation between Philippe Joseph, a Drake football player, and Erin Kane. Lloyd and Kane were white; Joseph was black. Joseph was holding Kane in the air with her feet kicking. Lloyd and another security guard, Steven Smith, thought Joseph was holding Kane in a headlock. Although Kane later claimed she and Joseph were just friends engaged in horseplay, Lloyd alleges Joseph's girlfriend called Lloyd and said Joseph had admitted to her that he and Kane were fighting. Lloyd ordered Joseph to release Kane. After Lloyd's second command, Joseph did so. Joseph suddenly made a 180-degree turn and lunged toward Lloyd with his fists raised to his chest and "an angry look on his face." Lloyd feared for his own safety and pepper sprayed Joseph.
Smith reached for his pepper spray at the same time and would have sprayed Joseph if Lloyd had not done so first. Another Drake security guard, Sergeant Risvold, attempted to handcuff Joseph, but was unable to do so-Joseph was still writhing from the pepper spray. Lloyd hit Joseph on the thigh with his baton, forcing him to the ground. Des Moines police officers took Joseph to the police station, where he was charged with disorderly conduct. Meanwhile, witnesses began screaming "racist, racist" at Lloyd. Students immediately discussed the incident with Drake's president, David Maxwell. Maxwell obtained Joseph's release and took him for medical treatment, even though he had not previously complained about any injuries resulting from the arrest. Joseph later pled guilty to disturbing the peace.
He also received a settlement from Drake. As local media reported on the street-painting episode, Lloyd's actions became the subject of a heated controversy. After the NAACP and Black Student Coalition demanded an investigation, Drake organized a panel to study the incident and related topics. The panel concluded Lloyd had overreacted and used unnecessary force. Although the panel determined Lloyd's actions at the street-painting event were not overtly racially motivated, the panel discovered some prior complaints against Lloyd involving minority students. (Lloyd, however, points out he was never reprimanded on any of those occasions.) The panel also criticized Drake for insufficiently training its security guards and its "ambiguous philosophy for security." During the investigation, Drake assigned Lloyd to a desk job. Maxwell assured Lloyd he would not lose his job. One of Lloyd's supervisors told Lloyd he was still in line for a promotion. Nonetheless, Drake fired Lloyd from his security position on June 16, 2002.
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Lloyd does not dispute he was an at-will employee. As a consequence, Drake could fire him for any lawful reason, or for no reason at all. A discharge is not lawful, however, when it violates public policy. Lloyd claims Drake violated public policy and thereby committed the tort of wrongful discharge when it fired him simply for upholding the criminal laws, i.e., attempting to arrest Joseph, a man he thought was assaulting a student. The district court dismissed Lloyd's wrongful-discharge claim ruling Drake had fired Lloyd for a variety of other lawful reasons, including (1) a desire to capitulate to outside pressures in the hopes of forestalling a lack of public confidence in Drake's security system; and (2) a determination- based upon newly rediscovered prior complaints and the panel's conclusion Lloyd used premature and excessive force in subduing Joseph-that Lloyd lacked the appropriate demeanor of a security guard. (On appeal, Drake also points out Lloyd's conduct affected its relationships with a variety of constituencies, and his retention could have cost it essential financial support.) We take a different route than the district court, but reach the same conclusion. Even assuming Lloyd was fired simply for upholding the law, we think his claim still fails because the public policy against discharge that Lloyd asserts is neither clearly defined nor well recognized.
In order to prevail on his wrongful-discharge claim Lloyd must first identify a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy that would be undermined by his dismissal. Only such policies are weighty enough "to overcome the employer's interest in operating its business in the manner it sees fit," which we have long and vigorously protected. Over the years we have recognized a number of clearly defined public policies. To date, however, we have not held that a private security guard's actions in "enforcing the criminal laws of the state" to be a well-recognized and clearly defined public policy. [Lloyd's] argument mostly consists of vague generalizations about the social desirability of upholding the criminal laws of the state. Lloyd also points out that there need not be an express statutory prohibition against discharge to underpin the public policy.
In a number of cases, we have "found an implied prohibition against retaliatory discharge based on an employee's exercise of a right conferred by a clearly articulated legislative enactment." The gist of Lloyd's argument is that because upholding the criminal laws is important and socially desirable conduct, this court should find a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine for a private security guard who tried to effectuate an arrest of a suspected criminal. Lloyd's argument is not well taken. We have little quarrel, however, with one of the basic premises of Lloyd's argument: namely, that the criminal laws of the state reflect a general public policy against crime, and in favor of the protection of the public. That said, the public policy asserted here is far too generalized to support an argument for an exception to the atwill doctrine.
In short, the public policy is not clearly defined. Apart from a vague reference to the whole of the criminal law, Lloyd cites no statutory or constitutional provision to buttress his claim. Divorced from any such provision or equivalent expression of public policy, we cannot find a well-recognized and clearly defined public policy in such vague generalizations. "Any effort to evaluate the public policy exception with generalized concepts of fairness and justice will result in an elimination of the at-will doctrine itself."
We can find no origin for the well-recognized and clearly defined public policy essential to carve out an exception to the at-will employment doctrine. There is nothing, then, to sustain the tort of wrongful discharge on these facts- however encouraged or frequently beneficial it may be to have private citizens take it upon themselves to enforce the criminal laws. The point is simply this: while we might be persuaded that society would be better off if private security personnel investigated and attempted to stop crimes in progress, we are not convinced it is a clear and well-recognized public policy of this state "that we all become citizen crime fighters." Affirmed.
Questions
1. a. Why did Lloyd lose this lawsuit?
b. Why did the Iowa Supreme Court decide that Lloyd had failed to establish the public policy exception?
c. Are you more convinced by the Iowa Supreme Court's reasoning, or the rationale offered by Drake to the District Court and on appeal? Explain.
2. Was Drake's decision to terminate Lloyd an appropriate response to this difficult situation? Explain.
3. Schuster worked, in an at-will relationship, for Derocili for 15 months, during which time she claims he touched her inappropriately and made numerous sexual comments despite her repeated rejections of those behaviors. Schuster received bonuses and good evaluations, but in a meeting between Schuster, Derocili, and Schuster's direct supervisor, Goff, she was fired for poor performance. Schuster's sexual harassment complaint with the Delaware Department of Labor was rejected as unsubstantiated. She sued Derocili for breach of contract, but the trial court dismissed that complaint. She appealed.
a. Does Schuster have a legitimate wrongful discharge claim? Explain.
b. Does she have any other plausible causes of action? Explain. See Schuster v. Derocili, 775 A.2d 1029 (Del. S.Ct. 2000).
4. In 2004, Touchstone Television Productions hired Nicollette Sheridan to play Edie Britt in the television series Desperate Housewives. Touchstone's agreement with Sheridan gave it the exclusive option to renew her services on an annual basis for up to an additional six seasons; Touchstone exercised this option for seasons 2 through 5. In February 2009, Touchstone informed the actress that it would not exercise its option for season 6, and that Edie Britt would be killed in a car accident during season 5. Sheridan alleged that Touchstone's decision was motivated by her complaint regarding a September 2008 incident in which Marc Cherry, the show's creator, allegedly hit her, amounting to a wrongful termination in breach of public policy. Decide. Explain. Touchstone Television Prod. v. Sheridan, 208 Cal. App. 4th 676 (Cal.Ct.App. 2012).
5. IBP operated a large hog-processing plant in Storm Lake, Iowa. IBP prohibited possession of "look-alike drugs" on company property. An employee, Michael Huegerich, was randomly and lawfully inspected as he was entering the plant. The inspection revealed an asthma medication, Maxalert, which was identical in appearance to an illegal street drug, "speed." Maxalert contained the stimulant ephedrine. The pills actually belonged to his girlfriend and were in his possession by accident. Huegerich was terminated for possessing a look-alike drug in violation of company policy. Huegerich admitted that he was generally aware of IBP drug policies, but since he was a transfer from another IBP division, he had not gone through the company orientation program where new employees were advised of the policy against look-alike drugs. About six months after his dismissal, two IBP employees told Huegerich that they had heard he was fired for possessing speed. Huegerich then sued IBP for, among other claims, wrongful discharge and defamation.
At trial, Huegerich provided no evidence as to how, when, and from whom the IBP employees had heard that he was terminated for possession of speed. The district court found for Huegerich in the amount of $24,000 on the wrongful discharge claim and $20,000 on the defamation claim. The court said that IBP was guilty of negligent discharge in failing to inform Huegerich about its drug policy. IBP appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court. Iowa law recognizes the doctrine of at-will employment with "narrow" exceptions for public policy violations and where a contract is created by an employer's handbook. Decide. Explain. See Huegerich v. IBP, 547 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa S.Ct. 1996).
6. Freeman, a television anchorperson employed by KSN, gave birth to her second child. On the day she returned from the hospital, she was notified that she had been dismissed. Six weeks later, she became unable to lactate. She sued KSN for wrongful discharge, tortious interference with contract, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Decide. Explain. See Freeman v. Medevac Midamerica of Kansas, Inc., 719 F.Supp. 995 (D Kan. 1989).