Case Study:
[A union picketed an employer seeking an agreement by which the employer would retain only those workers who were union members or who applied for union membership within 30 days. The employer sought an injunction and damages in state court, both of which were granted. Concurrently, proceedings had been instituted before the NLRB. The Board, however, declined jurisdiction because the amount of interstate commerce involved did not meet its monetary standards. On appeal, the state supreme court held that since the NLRB declined jurisdiction, the state courts had power over the dispute. The case reached the Supreme Court, which remanded it. On remand, the state supreme court set aside the injunction but sustained the award of damages. Once again the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.] FRANKFURTER, J…. In determining the extent to which state regulation must yield to subordinating federal authority, we have been concerned with delimiting areas of potential conflict; potential conflict of rules of law, of remedy, and of administration. The nature of the judicial process precludes an ad hoc inquiry into the special problems of labor-management relations involved in a particular set of occurrences in order to ascertain the precise nature and degree of federal-state conflict there involved, and more particularly what exact mischief such a conflict would cause. Nor is it our business to attempt this. Such determinations inevitably depend upon judgments on the impact of these particular conflicts on the entire scheme of federal labor policy and administration. Our task is confined to dealing with classes of situations. To the National Labor Relations Board and to Congress must be left those precise and closely limited demarcations that can be adequately fashioned only by legislation and administration. We have necessarily been concerned with the potential conflict of two law-enforcing authorities, with the disharmonies inherent in two systems, one federal, the other state, of inconsistent standards of substantive law and differing remedial schemes. But the unifying consideration of our decisions has been in regard to the fact that Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience. Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes towards labor controversies…. A multiplicity of tribunals and diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law…. When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the states free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law. Nor has it mattered whether the states have acted through laws of broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the states to control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national purposes. At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the states was governed by Section 7 or Section 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board. What is outside the scope of this Court’s authority cannot remain within a state’s power and state jurisdiction too must yield to the exclusive primary competence of the Board.… The case before us is such a case. The adjudication in California has throughout been based on the assumption that the behavior of the petitioning unions constituted an unfair labor practice. This conclusion was derived by the California courts from the facts as well as from their view of the Act. It is not for us to decide whether the National Labor Relations Board would have, or should have decided these questions in the same manner. When an activity is arguably subject to Section 7 or Section 8 of the Act, the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted. To require the states to yield to the primary jurisdiction of the National Board does not ensure Board adjudication of the status of a disputed activity. If theBoard decides, subject to appropriate federal judicial review, that conduct is protected by Section 7, or prohibited by Section 8, then the matter is at an end, and the States are ousted of all jurisdiction. Or, the Board may decide that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited, and thereby raise the question whether such activity may be regulated by the States. However, the Board may also fail to determine the status of the disputed conduct by declining to assert jurisdiction, or by refusal of the general counsel to file a charge, or by adopting some other disposition which does not define the nature of the activity with unclouded legal significance. This was the basic problem underlying our decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1. In that case we held that the failure of the National Labor Relations Board to assume jurisdiction did not leave the states free to regulate activities they would otherwise be precluded from regulating. It follows that the failure of the Board to define the legal significance under the Act of a particular activity does not give the states the power to act. In the absence of the Board’s clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited or of compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, it is not for this Court to decide whether such activities are subject to state jurisdiction. The withdrawal of this narrow area from possible state activity follows from our decision in Weber and Guss. The governing consideration is that to allow the states to control activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy. Reversed.
Q1. Why did the NLRB decline jurisdiction?
Q2. According to the Court, to which body did Congress entrust the administration of national labor policy?
Q3. What is the basic premise behind the Court’s holding that the state courts must yield to federal law?
Q4. Does the failure of the Board to define the legal significance under the NLRA of a particular activity give the states the power to act?
Your answer must be, typed, double-spaced, Times New Roman font (size 12), one-inch margins on all sides, APA format and also include references.