Derive the players best-response

1. Consider the following game:

L R

U 2, 4 -1, 6

D 0, 10 5, 0

a)  For what range of beliefs θ2 = (θ(L), 1 - θ2(L))) is U a best response for player 1? [Your answer should take the form: a  ≤ θ2(L) ≤ b for specific numbers a and b, which may or may not be distinct.]

b)  For what  range of beliefs θ2 = (θ(L), 1 - θ2(L))) is D a best response for player 1? Show your derivation clearly.

c)  For what range of  beliefs θ2 = (θ(L), 1 - θ2(L))) are both U and D best responses for player 1?

2 Consider the partnership game with synergy.  Player 1 chooses 0 ≤ x ≤ b, and Player 2 chooses 0 ≤ y ≤ b, if the parameter b is a positive number. If b = ∞, x and y can be any  nonnegative real numbers. The effort levels x, y produce the partnership revenue  4(x + y + cxy). The personal effort costs are x 2  for Player 1 and y  2  for Player 2. Each player receives half the partnership revenue minus her personal effort cost. The synergy  parameter c is a positive constant.

a)  Derive the players' best-response functions. Show your derivation clearly.

b)  For b = 10 and c =2/3  find the rationalizable strategies for each player.

Do three iterations of deletion of dominated strategies to show that your answer is correct.

c)  For b = ∞ and c =2/3  , find the rationalizable strategies for each player.

Do three iterations of deletion of dominated strategies to show that your answer is correct.

d)  For b = ∞ and c = 2, are there any rationalizable strategies? Explain your answer.