Problem: Please Explain ways in which external social pressures have influenced your decision
Case Scenario 1:
If I were involved in the dilemma in this case, I could recommend a few solutions to help solve the problem that Ford developed with the Pinto. One of the solutions in this case is to go to a supervisor and let him or her know to build a car safe for the public. Despite that the process will take longer than two years, the original deadline would have to be changed. The argument could further be supported by posing the question to management that Ford could lose its market because if Ford knowingly produces a vehicle that could cause harm, then the trust of the customers will be lost. In this case, it is important to remove the profit factor that the company is focusing on by maybe doing another cost-analysis as a second look because the risk expenditure to ensure safety is far less than facing a public civil suit. The fact is that Ford knew of the fallacy. After the crash-tests were done on the Pinto, the results reflected that the car was unsafe for the public because the car would explode into flames when hit from behind (DeGeorge, 2005). Lee Iacocca knowingly knew this issue; however, he set his purpose on profit and not safety. If I had knowledge to this matter, I would have went to a supervisor and explained to him or her that people can be hurt or even killed. At that point if there was no further action taken, I would have went to the next level of supervisors, and I would have kept going until I reached the executive level, and the board of directors. Then if the issue were still unresolved, I would have to become a whistle blower because I know that “If the danger is such that people are likely to die from the defect, then clearly it should be repaired before being sold” (DeGeorge, 2005, p. 303). Essentially, if an item is sold to the public and it is known that there is harm in the consumption of that product, then the public has a right to know of the dangers.
Case Scenario: The Ford Pinto Case
In the late 1960s American automobiles were losing market share to smaller Japanese imports. Lee Iacocca, then CEO of the Ford Motor Company, wanted a 1971 model to meet the competition. He reportedly ordered that Ford produce a car for 1971 that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and that would be priced at less than $2,000. That meant that the car had to be designed and produced in 25 months rather than the usual 43 months for a new car line. The resulting car was the Pinto. Because of the accelerated production schedule, the Pinto was not tested for rear-end impact until after it was produced. There was no National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rear-end impact standard at the time. Ford engineers knew that testing for rear-end impact is a standard safety procedure. The car was tested after production, and it failed the test, meaning that it fell below the state of the art for cars of that size. The design of the car placed the fuel tank such that if the car was hit from the rear at a speed above 20 miles per hour, it would be punctured by a bolt from the bumper and could possibly burst into flame. Ford did a study and determined that if a baffle (estimated at costing between $6.65 and $11) were placed between the bumper and the gas tank, the Pinto would be comparable to other cars of its class with respect to the danger of fire from rear-end impact. A company cost-benefit analysis that weighed the cost of adding the baffle against the estimated cost of suits resulting from “excess” accidental deaths and injuries indicated that it would cost the company less not to insert the baffle than to insert it. For whatever reason, the company did not change the design from 1971 to 1978. Nor did the company offer its customers the option of purchasing the baffle.
Between 1976 and 1977 alone, Pintos suffered thirteen fiery rear-end collisions, which was more than double the number for comparable-size cars. As it turned out, suits brought against Ford and the amount it had to pay (estimated at more than $50 million) far exceeded what it saved ($20.9 million) by not correcting the defect—not to mention the cost of bad publicity. Nonetheless, despite reports of fires in the Pinto, the car sold well through 1978, when it was finally recalled to have the baffle inserted. When the State of Oregon, because of safety concerns, sold its fleet of Pintos at public auction, the cars went for as much as $1,800 each. Obviously, buyers discounted the danger, weighing it against the cost of what was considered adequate transportation at a good price.
Ford’s actions with respect to the Pinto have been widely criticized. Harley Copp, a former Ford executive and engineer, was critical of the Pinto from the start. He left the company and voiced his criticism, which was taken up by Ralph Nader and others. Of course, the Ford engineers were not instructed to make an unsafe car, nor did Ford management set out to do so. That the Pinto was arguably below the state of the art may have been a result of the accelerated production schedule.
That the defect was not corrected after the initial production year was the result of a business decision.