Assignment:
Hanson v. America West Airlines 544 F.Supp.2d 1038 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Central Dist. Cal. 2008)
Judge Guilford BACKGROUND Plaintiff David Hanson ("Plaintiff") has lost his head. More specifically, Plaintiff has lost an artistically and scientifically valuable robotic head modeled after famous science fiction author Philip K. Dick ("Head"). Dick's well-known body of work has resulted in movies-such as Total Recall, Blade Runner, Minority Report, and A Scanner Darkly, and a large group of admirers has grown following his death in Orange County, California, in 1982. His stories have questioned whether robots can be human so it seems appropriate that Plaintiff reincarnated Dick as a robot which included the Head, valued at around $750,000. Plaintiff lost his Head on one of Defendant's planes when flying from Texas to San Francisco with a connection in Las Vegas.
Plaintiff brought the Head onto the plane in a carry-on duffel bag and stored it in the overhead bin. Plaintiff fell asleep during the flight from Texas to Las Vegas, and woke up when the plane arrived in Las Vegas. On waking, Plaintiff immediately left the plane to catch his connecting flight to San Francisco. Perhaps because he had just woken up, Plaintiff lacked the total recall to remember to retrieve the Head from the overhead bin.
According to Plaintiff, as soon as he got to San Francisco, he went to the baggage counter, spoke to Defendant's employee, Leanne Miller ("Miller"), and informed her of the problem. Miller told him that the airplane with his Head was in flight, and could not be checked until it landed in Southern California. Plaintiff offered to fly to Southern California to regain his Head, but Miller told him not to do that. According to Plaintiff, he informed Miller of the importance and value of the Head, and she replied that all efforts would be made to recover the Head and that it would receive "special treatment." Plaintiff asserts that about 45 minutes later, Miller called him with the good news that the Head had been found in Orange County. Plaintiff "remained willing" to go retrieve his Head, but Miller replied that it would be sent to San Francisco.
According to Plaintiff, Miller then informed him of the special security procedures that would be taken to protect and deliver the Head. Plaintiff told Miller that Plaintiff's friend Craig Grossman would be at the airport to pick up the Head. Grossman waited for the Head at the San Francisco airport, but it never arrived and has not been found since. While hearts may be left in San Francisco, heads apparently are left in Orange County, or are simply lost or stolen.
Plaintiff sued Defendant in California state court for conversion, negligence, and involuntary bailment. Defendant removed the case to federal court, and here moves for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
1. Contractual Liability Limitations
Defendant argues that it contractually limited its liability for loss of Plaintiff's goods. . . . Federal common law allows a carrier to limit its liability for lost or damaged goods if the contract limiting liability offers the shipper (1) reasonable notice of the limited liability, and (2) a fair opportunity to buy higher liability.
2. Plaintiff's Arguments Plaintiff argues that Defendant is liable for the lost head because (1) there was a material deviation from the Contract of Carriage and (2) Plaintiff's discussion with Miller altered the terms of the original Contract of Carriage or created a new contract.
2.1 Material Deviation Doctrine
The material deviation doctrine states that where a carrier effects a fundamental breach of a contract by materially deviating from the contract's terms, the carrier is liable for damage to or loss of the shipped goods. Cases have further defined the boundaries of this doctrine. For example, in Nipponkoa Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 431 F.Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), a carrier promised to take special measures to protect a shipment of laptop computers, including using high security locks and video surveillance. The court found that the carrier breached that promise by failing to use either high security locks or video surveillance. The court held that the carrier was responsible for the loss of the computers under the Agents can bind their principals only if they have actual or apparent authority to do so. Actual authority may be either express or implied.
If a principal specifically authorizes an agent to act, the agent has express authority to take that action. If a principle "merely states the general nature of what the agent is to do, the agent is said to have implied authority to do acts consistent with the direction." Miller did not have express authority to contract with Plaintiff. The original Contract of Carriage provided that: No employee of U.S. Airways has the authority to waive, modify, or alter any provisions of these terms of Defendant's potential conduct, such as, "potentially informing the wrong crew of the value of the HEAD" and "potentially informing the thief of the high value of the HEAD."
These theories, while heady, are insufficient. At best, Plaintiff's theory is that, since the Head did not arrive at its destination, Defendants must have done something wrong. This is not evidence of a breach or material deviation. Defendant may have done everything as promised, only to fall victim to a head hunting thief or other skullduggery. Alternatively, Defendant could have been negligent, and still not have committed a fundamental breach. The possibility of such negligence is "considered an inherent risk of shipping." Information Control, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 641. Thus, even if Plaintiff's discussion with Miller altered or created a new contract, there is no evidence establishing Defendant's liability based on breach or material deviation.
Questions
1. As a matter of law, why did America West win this case?
2. Why was this Contract of Carriage not considered unfair and one-sided and thus unenforceable?
3. Why did America West's behavior not constitute a "material deviation" from the Contract of Carriage?
4. Ning Yan went to Gay's fitness center to use a one-week complimentary pass. On each visit he signed in on a sheet that contained a standard exculpatory clause including this language: "I also understand that Vital Power Fitness Center assumes no responsibility for any injuries and/or sicknesses incurred to me. . . ." On February 18, 1999, Yan fell from a treadmill and sustained a severe head injury. He later died from that injury. No one witnessed the fall. Yan's estate claims he struck his head against a window ledge because the treadmill was placed too close to the window. If he did strike the window ledge, who would likely win this case? Explain. See Xu v. Gay, 668 N.W.2d 166 (Ct. App. Mich. 2003).